Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism — Edition Insights

Thesis as a Dual Work: Critical Study and Translation

Patrick's volume is explicitly divided into two parts: a critical essay on Pyrrhonism and a translation of Sextus' first book of the Hypotyposes. In the preface, she notes that this translation is intended as a 'useful contribution to the literature on Pyrrhonism.' The critical portion examines the historical development of Pyrrhonism and its relation to Academic Scepticism, while the translation makes the primary source accessible to English readers. Patrick specifies her textual sources—Bekker and Fabricius—and preserves the chapter divisions and paragraph numbers from Fabricius' manuscript-based edition. This dual structure means readers can move between Patrick's analysis and Sextus' own words, though the excerpts provided here focus on the critical essay.

Empiricism and the Ten Tropes of Epoche

Patrick identifies empiricism as a defining feature of Pyrrhonism, linking it to the school's scientific lore and the fact that 'so many of the Sceptics were physicians.' She argues that the ten Tropes of epochē (suspension of judgment) reflect this empirical character. The foundation principles, she asserts, are due to Pyrrho himself, while the elaborated arguments and details belong to later followers. This distinction between original core and later elaboration is a key analytical move. Patrick does not list the ten Tropes in the excerpt, but she grounds them in the school's practical, observational approach, contrasting this with the dialectic method of the Academy.

Pyrrhonism versus Academic Scepticism: A Dialectic Contrast

A central thread in Patrick's analysis is the distinction between Pyrrhonism and Academic Scepticism. She traces the latter to Arcesilaus, who introduced doubt into the Academy by claiming to return to Socratic dialectic. Patrick notes that Sextus himself describes Arcesilaus as almost a Pyrrhonean, but insists his scepticism was only apparent, a 'cloak' for loyalty to Plato. She cites the contemporary Timon, who called Arcesilaus a dogmatist and refused to join the Academy. The contrast is crystallized in Ariston's epigram: 'Plato before, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle.' Patrick uses this to show that despite periods of convergence, the two sceptical traditions remained distinct in origin and method.

The Role of Sextus Empiricus in Patrick's Argument

Patrick treats Sextus Empiricus as both a source and a subject. She draws on his Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos for evidence about Pyrrhonism and Academic Scepticism. For instance, she cites Sextus' claim that Arcesilaus' scepticism was only apparent (Hyp. I. 232) and his characterization of Timon as the 'prophet of Pyrrho' (Adv. Math. I. 53). Patrick also uses Sextus to establish the timeline: after Timon's death, the Pyrrhonean School had no representative until Ptolemy of Cyrene, leaving Greek scepticism to the Academy. This reliance on Sextus as a witness is careful—Patrick does not treat his accounts as neutral but as part of the tradition she is analyzing.

Reading the Translation Alongside the Critical Essay

Patrick's translation of the first book of the Hypotyposes is appended to the critical study, and the two are meant to be used together. The critical essay provides historical context and interpretive guidance, while the translation offers direct access to Sextus' text. Readers may find it useful to consult the translation after reading the essay, or to move back and forth. Patrick's footnotes in the critical section (e.g., references to Hyp. I. 232) point to specific passages in the translated work. This structure allows the reader to verify Patrick's claims against the primary source, though the excerpts here do not include the translation itself.

Patrick's thesis is best approached as a scholarly tool: read the critical essay first to grasp her historical framework, then turn to the translation of Sextus' Hypotyposes to encounter the Pyrrhonean arguments directly. The footnotes and references in the essay will guide you to key passages. Because the work is a doctoral dissertation, its language is formal and its arguments dense, but the dual structure rewards careful study.

Reading that old doctoral thesis on Sextus Empiricus, I kept circling back to how the ancient sceptics treated truth as something perpetually deferred—never settled, only approached. It reminded me, oddly, of a quieter modern thread in pragmatism, where truth likewise becomes a matter of ongoing verification rather than fixed certainty. That echo stayed with me while revisiting The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey — A Reader’s Guide, a gentler, more practical cousin to Pyrrho’s restless questioning.